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1. Introduction 
 
 Since the 1990s, when economic sanctions imposed by the United Nations (UN) on Iraq reportedly 
resulted in up to 227,000 deaths caused by skyrocketing food prices and limited medical supplies,1 the 
international community has been more attuned to the possible negative impacts that such measures might 
have on human rights in the targeted state.2 In 2014, the the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) reaffirmed 
that ‘essential goods, such as food and medicines, should not be used as tools for political coercion and 
that under no circumstances should people be deprived of their own means of subsistence and 
development.’3 However, as global societies and economies have evolved, so too have the nature of 
sanctions regimes and their effects. Increasingly, sanctions regimes imposed by states and international 
organizations, led by the UN, the European Union (EU) and the United States (US), specifically restrict the 
transfer of technological goods and services, which might be used by the targeted regime in weapons 
development, surveillance, or cyberwarfare.4 Only in the past decade has it been considered that many of 
these very same tools and services also have tremendous positive effects on the exercise of human rights 
in the targeted state, used by citizens as a means of communication, accessing information, and otherwise 
engaging with the global economy of information and communication technologies (ICTs).5  
This issue gained recognition in the context of US-imposed sanctions during the 2009 Iranian Green 
Movement and the Arab Spring, when ICTs including platforms like Twitter, Facebook, and Telegram played 
a pivotal role in civil society organizing against repressive governments,6 despite sophisticated state-
sponsored surveillance and censorship programs.7 The international community soon realized the 
importance of ICTs for sharing information, communication, and evading government censors and 
                                                     
1 A/HRC/39/54, para 34 
2 Dursun Peksen, “Better or Worse? The Effect of Economic Sanctions on Human Rights,” (Journal of Peace 
Research, 46(1) 2009), p. 59; see also David Cortright and George Lopez, “Smart sanctions: targeting economic 
statecraft,” (Rowman & Littlefield, 2002) 
3 A/HRC/RES/27/21, para 9 
4 Pinky P. Mehta, “Sanctioning freedoms: U.S. sanctions against Iran affecting information and technology 
companies,” (UPJIL, 37(2) 2016), p. 768 
5 Danielle Kehl, Tim Maurer, & Sonia Phene, “Translating Norms to the Digital Age: Technology and the Free Flow 
of Information under U.S. Sanctions,” (NEW AM. FOUND., 4 Dec. 2013), p. 2 
6 Mehta, p. 765 
7 Peter Harrell and Collin Anderson, “U.S. Sanctions Abet Iranian Internet Censorship,” (Foreign Policy, January 22, 
2018) 
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surveillance, as well as the severe impact that sanctions had on access to these tools.8 The US State 
Department acknowledged this reality in a formal statement, recognizing that ‘Over the last several years, 
the world has witnessed the important role this technology can assume in holding repressive regimes 
accountable, assisting people in exercising their human rights and protecting emerging elements of civil 
society.’9 Accordingly, the US took steps to amend sanctions policies by providing exemptions for certain 
technologies across active sanctions regimes in Cuba, Syria, Sudan, and Iran.10  
However, many claim that these measures have had little effect on the accessibility of US-sourced 
technologies in the targeted states,11 in part due to ‘overcompliance’ on the part of companies subject to 
these export restrictions, either because of a lack of clarity around sanctions policies or overly cautious 
approaches to compliance.12 The impact on human rights as a consequence of continued sanctions-related 
restrictions on access to technology has reportedly been substantial and broad in scope. For example, after 
a 2018 country visit to Syria, the UN Special Rapporteur on the negative impact of unilateral coercive 
measures on the enjoyment of human rights, Idriss Jazairy, reported that US sanctions prohibited the export 
of ‘almost all electronic goods, including computers and mobile smartphones with American processors or 
software,’ and had affected nearly all sectors of the economy.13 After a similar visit to Sudan, the Special 
Rapporteur reported that the lack of technical support and equipment due to US sanctions left medical 
professionals struggling to conduct effective medical diagnostics and deprived students of software and 
technology which would improve their learning.14 As one expert described in the context of Iran, prior to the 
issuing of general licenses in 2010, sanctions on technology exports were so broad that they ‘could 
encompass everything developed in the computer age.’15  
                                                     
8 Kehl et al, p. 2 
9 U.S. Dep’t of State, Pub. Notice 8086, State Department Sanctions Information and Guidance (Nov. 8, 2012). 
10 U.S. Dep’t of Treas., General License Related to Personal Communication Services (2010); U.S. Dep’t of Treas., 
General License D-1 with Respect to Certain Services, Software, and Hardware Incident to Personal 
Communications (2014). 
11 Elias Groll, “Why US sanctions are actually helping Iran crack down on protesters,” (Foreign Policy, Jan 7, 2018) 
12 Mehta, p. 778; see also A/HRC/39/54/Add.2, para 37 
13 A/HRC/39/54/Add.2, para 47 
14 A/HRC/33/48/Add.1, para 25 
15 Vahe Petrossian, “Iran Back in the Firing Line,” 36 MIDDLE E. ECON. DIG. 2, 2 (Dec. 4, 1992) 
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As such, it is clear that restrictions on technology can have broad effects on the targeted state’s 
population, which have serious implications for the protection of many fundamental human rights.16 
Nevertheless, economic sanctions continue to be a regular feature of modern foreign policy with 14 active 
sanctions regimes currently implemented by the UN Security Council,17 and more than 30 separate 
unilateral sanctions regimes imposed by the US and EU respectively.18 With cyber operations including 
surveillance, online censorship, and state-sponsored hacking emerging as an increasingly common feature 
of both internal and external modern conflicts,19 it is reasonable to assume that technology will continue to 
play an important role in future sanctions regimes. Thus far, efforts to address this matter have typically 
approached it from the perspective of policy,20 however, given the above-stated effects and their potential 
impact on human rights, this essay seeks examine whether states might be held legally responsible under 
the international human rights law framework for violations related to the impact of technology sanctions. 
Applying a human rights law framework to this matter presents a number of challenges and involves a 
convergence of multiple areas of legal uncertainty. For one, whereas human rights have typically been 
understood as legal obligations owed by a state to its citizens,21 the matter of sanctions deals with the 
relationship between the human rights obligations of a state imposing sanctions with respect to the impact 
of its policies on the population of another, otherwise known as extraterritorial obligations.22  The nature of 
such obligations is subject to endless debate amongst legal scholars and inconsistent jurisprudence within 
and across human rights courts.23 Further, considering that the human rights framework was developed 
before many modern technologies and their implications for individual rights could have been imagined, 
                                                     
16 Dursun Peksen. & A. Cooper Drury, “Economic Sanctions and Political Repression: Assessing the Impact of 
Coercive Diplomacy on Political Freedoms,” (Hum Rights Rev, Vol. 10, Issue 3, 2009) 
17 UN DPPA Fact Sheets, “Subsidiary Organs of the United Nations Security Council,” (8 February 2019). 
18 European Parliament, “EU sanctions: A key foreign and security policy instrument,” (May 2018) and U.S. Dept. of 
Treasury, “Sanctions Programs and Country Information”.  
19 Giovanni Ziccardi, Resistance, Liberation Technology and Human Rights in the Digital Age, (Springer Netherlands, 
2013), ch. 6. 
20 see Mehta and Kehl et al. 
21 Malcolm Langford et al (eds.), Global Justice, State Duties: The Extraterritorial Scope of Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights in International Law, (CUP, 2012), p. 3 
22 The Special Rapporteur on the negative impact of unilateral coercive measures has raised as an unresolved 
matter whether ‘States (or international organizations) are subject to extraterritorial obligations under human 
rights instruments in relation to the application and effects of sanctions;’ see A/HRC/36/44, para 20 
23 see Marko Milanovic, Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties: Law, Principles, and Policy, (OUP, 
2011) 
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and despite efforts within the UN to bring understandings of human rights obligations up to date with the 
digital age, the scope and content of human rights with respect to modern technology is not well-
established.24  
The following analysis will thus seek to address each of these matters in turn, drawing on the existing 
human rights law framework and applying it to the effects of technology sanctions. Chapter 2 will first 
address the issue of extraterritorial obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), as well the 
human rights responsibilities applicable to multinational corporations given their role in implementing 
sanctions. Chapter 3 will then consider the effects of technology sanctions, focusing on US sanctions in 
Iran, Syria, and Sudan as these are the most well-documented case studies available,25 with regard to the 
content of the implicated rights contained in both the ICCPR and ICESCR. It will then evaluate these effects 
in light of the legal obligations and models of extraterritorial jurisdiction identified in chapter 2, in order to 
assess whether such effects could amount to violation of a state or international organization’s human rights 
obligations. 
 
2.  Extent of Legal Obligations 
 
2.1 Scope of Human Rights Obligations 
 
 The human rights legal framework primarily consists of the fundamental norms established by the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the ICCPR and its two optional protocols, and ICESCR. 
Both the ICCPR and ICESCR establish obligations which state parties to the treaties are legally bound to 
respect, protect, and fulfil, and together with customary international human rights obligations form the 
foundation of the international human rights law framework.26 Other instruments have been adopted at the 
regional level, as have more specialized international treaties, however, the scope of this paper will focus 
                                                     
24 Jacopo Coccoli, ‟The Challenges of New Technologies in the Implementation of Human Rights: an Analysis of 
Some Critical Issues in the Digital Era,” (Peace Human Rights Governance, 2017), p. 229 
25 As this analysis focuses on international human rights law, any conclusions drawn with respect to US sanctions 
would generally apply to similar sanctions regimes imposed by other states or international organizations 
26 Frédéric Mégret, “Nature of Obligations,” in Moeckli et al. (eds) International human rights law (3rd edn. OUP 
2014) 
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on the legal obligations established under ICCPR and ICESCR, to which the vast majority of states are 
party to.27 
While the content of the specific rights affected by technology sanctions will be discussed alongside 
the human rights impact of such measures in chapter 3, this chapter primarily focuses on the general legal 
obligations set out in the treaties, namely which individuals states owe human rights obligations to. In all 
cases, determining a violation of international legal obligations rests on whether specific conduct may be 
attributed to the State and whether or not that conduct constitutes a breach of the obligations owed by the 
State.28 However, international human rights treaties like the ICCPR and the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR) uniquely introduce one-way obligations owed to certain individuals ‘subject to the 
degree of attachment’ between the individual and the contracting state.29 Thus, a third determining factor 
arises in the context of human rights violations, typically defined as one of ‘jurisdiction.’30 While this 
requirement has led to the dominant understanding of human rights obligations as something owed by the 
state to its own citizens, there is growing recognition that human rights law may also apply extraterritorially.31 
However, as the UN General Assembly recognized in 2017, ‘the scope of such obligations remains a matter 
of contention.’32 This chapter will consider the current models and debates regarding extraterritorial 
jurisdiction with respect to the ICCPR and ICESCR, as well as the emerging understanding of human rights 
duties and obligations as they apply to corporate non-state actors.  
 
2.1.1 Civil and Political Rights 
 
                                                     
27 While the US has only signed but not ratified ICESCR, some aspects of the treaty are now recognized as 
customary international law binding on all states. Further, under article 18(a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties (1969), as a signatory the US is obligated not to take actions that would defeat the ‘object and purpose’ 
of the treaty; see Margot E. Salomon, “Deprivation, Causation and the Law of Intl Cooperation,” in Langford et al 
(eds), p. 270 
28 “Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, in Report of the International Law 
Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-third Session,” UN GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 43, UN Doc. A/56/10 
(2001), Article 1 
29 Maarten den Heijer and Rick Lawson, “Extraterritorial Human Rights and the Concept of ‘Jurisdiction’” in, 
Langford et al (eds), p. 158 
30 Martin Scheinin, “Just Another word? Jurisdiction in the Roadmaps of State Responsibility and Human Rights,” in 
Langford et al (eds) 
31 see Mark Gibney and Sigrun Skogly, Universal human rights and extraterritorial obligations, (University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2010) 
32 GA A/72/370 (2017), para 34 
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Human rights treaties define their scope of application differently on the basis of ‘jurisdiction’33 and 
‘territory.’34 While some human rights treaties contain no mention of ‘jurisdiction,’ such as the ICESCR 
discussed later in this chapter, and thus might be interpreted more broadly, others such as the ICCPR and 
ECHR35 are more limited. Article 2(1) of the ICCPR requires States ‘to respect and to ensure [rights] to all 
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction.’ The most widely adopted36 reading of this 
provision, articulated in HRC General Comment 31, holds that States owe rights to all persons ‘within their 
territory’ and to all persons ‘subject to their jurisdiction,’ meaning that ‘a State party must respect and ensure 
the rights laid down in the Covenant to anyone within the power or effective control of that State Party, even 
if not situated within the territory of the State Party.’37 However, the HRC has also stated that ‘it would be 
unconscionable to so interpret the responsibility under article 2 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
as to permit a State party to perpetrate violations of the Covenant on the territory of another State, which 
violations it could not perpetrate on its own territory.’38 This opinion is cited by Jazairy as grounds for the 
existence of extraterritorial obligations with respect to States enacting unilateral sanction,39 although it is 
questionable whether this is supported by existing models of extraterritorial obligations established through 
international jurisprudence. 
Extraterritorial obligations were first discussed by human rights courts in relation to State occupation of 
foreign territory. The Loizidou40 case, concerning Turkey’s occupation of Northern Cyprus, was the first to 
establish jurisdiction on the basis of ‘effective control,’ asserting that jurisdiction is not derived from a State’s 
mere presence in a foreign territory, but rather the level of control exerted within it.41 Thus, states have 
extraterritorial human rights obligations with respect to any individual located within a territory under its 
                                                     
33 Some treaties, such as the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), contain no 
mention of ‘jurisdiction’ and thus might apply more broadly; see note 29, p. 159 
34 Olivier de Schutter, International Human Rights Law: Cases, Materials, Commentary (2nd edn, CUP 2014), p. 147 
35 Under ECHR Art. 1, States owe the treaty rights ‘to everyone within their jurisdiction’ 
36 The United States and Israel adopt a conjunctive reading which rules out the extraterritorial application of ICCPR; 
see Ashley Deeks, “Does the ICCPR Establish an Extraterritorial Right to Privacy?” Lawfare, (14 Nov 2013) 
37 HRC General Comment 31, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, para 10 
38 A/36/40, Sergio Euben Lopez-Burgos v. Uruguay, communication no. R.12/52, para. 12.3. 
39 A/70/345 (2015), para 14 
40 Loizidou v. Turkey (Judgment), App. No. 15318/89, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1995), para. 62  
41 Milanovic, p. 118 
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effective control (spatial model).42 However, jurisdiction has also been defined with respect to power or 
effective control over individuals (personal model)43 such as in the Human Rights Committee’s ruling in 
Lopez-Burgos v. Uruguay, which held that ‘jurisdiction’ does not necessarily refer to the territory in which 
the violation occurred, ‘but rather to the relationship between the individual and the State.’44  
The European Court of Human Rights’ (ECtHR) decision in Bankovic v Belgium45 rejected major 
aspects of the Lopez-Burgos decision, holding that not every exercise of authority affecting a person’s 
enjoyment of human rights brings that person under a State’s jurisdiction and reasserting the notion that 
jurisdiction is primarily territorial.46 However, the Bankovic decision was largely reversed by a later ECtHR 
judgement in Al-Skeini and Others v. UK, a detention case in which the Court recognized both ‘control and 
authority’ by a state agent and ‘effective control’ of territory as constitutive of extraterritorial jurisdiction, and 
asserted a ‘divided and tailored’ approach to rights obligations.47 Under this view, extraterritorial obligations 
are contextual such that control over the individual does not necessarily give rise to the full spectrum of 
human rights obligations, but only those relevant to the given situation. This conception has been further 
expanded to include situations where a State does not physically detain an individual but still exercises 
authority and control over them, such as within a vehicle checkpoint48 or in the case of Pad v Turkey, where 
the ECtHR found that Turkey exercised jurisdiction over the right to life of victims killed by gunfire from a 
helicopter.49  
Earlier models of extraterritorial jurisdiction based on effective control and state agent authority and 
control would likely not apply to the situation of human rights interferences resulting from economic 
sanctions, given that the effects of sanctions do not depend on the sanctioning state exercising physical 
presence or effective control within the targeted state.50 However, more recent jurisprudence51 suggests 
                                                     
42 see Advisory Opinion Concerning Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, International Court of Justice (ICJ), 9 July 2004, para 109 
43 see HRC General Comment 31, para 10 
44 Lopez-Burgos v. Uruguay, paras 12.2–12.3 
45 Bankovic et al. v. 17 NATO Member States App no. 52207/99 (ECtHR, 12 December 2001)   
46 Milanvoic, p. 118 
47 Al-Skeini v. Sec’y of State for Def. (Judgement), App. No. 55721/07, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R., para 79; see also Öcalan v. 
Turkey [GC], no. 46221/99, § 91, ECHR 2005-IV 
48 Jaloud v the Netherlands, App. No. 47708/08, 2014 
49 Pad and Others v Turkey, App. No. 60167/00, 2007 
50 GA A/72/370, para 44 
51 see note 48 and 49 
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that exercising control and authority over an individual’s rights, regardless of physical proximity or territorial 
control, is sufficient grounds for finding extraterritorial obligations with respect to those rights. Such cases 
lend some validity to a third model of jurisdiction, referred to as the ‘impact model,’ described by legal 
scholar Marko Milanovic.52 Drawing on the notion that rights may be ‘divided and tailored’ based on the 
level of control exerted, Milanovic argues that a state’s obligation to respect human rights, which does not 
depend on control over an area, should be territorially unbound and incurred whenever a state has an 
impact on an individual’s rights extraterritorially.53 In General Comment 36, the HRC seems to articulate a 
similar understanding, asserting that states have an obligation to ‘respect and ensure’ rights to ‘all persons 
over whose enjoyment of the right to life it exercises power or effective control.’54 It further specifies that 
this ‘includes persons located outside any territory effectively controlled by the State, whose right to life is 
nonetheless impacted by its military or other activities in a direct and foreseeable manner.’55 While some 
states objected to this formulation of extraterritorial obligations, which is not entirely supported by existing 
jurisprudence, legal scholars have argued that it would address many of the existing inconsistencies in the 
established practice of the HRC and ECtHR with respect to extraterritorial obligations.56 Applied in the 
context of technology sanctions, it seems a more promising approach for establishing extraterritorial 
obligations for the sanctioning state on the basis that by restricting access to certain ICT tools, the state 
exercises power over the rights implicated in the use of ICTs, such as the right to freedom of expression, 
despite having no physical presence or effective control in the targeted state. 
 
2.1.2 Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
 
 As shown above, the typical approach to extraterritoriality with respect to civil and political rights 
has largely centered on the degree to which territory and jurisdiction limit the scope of state obligations.57 
The same does not hold true for economic, social and cultural (ESC) rights given that article 2(1) of the 
                                                     
52 Milanovic, p. 209 
53 ibid, p. 211 
54 CCPR/C/GC/36, para 63; see also Concluding Observations: United Kingdom (2008), para. 14 
55 General Comment 36, para 63; see also Concluding Observations: USA (2014), para. 9 
56 Daniel Møgster, “Towards Universality: Activities Impacting the Enjoyment of the Right to Life and the 
Extraterritorial Application of the ICCPR,” (EJIL Talk!, 27 Nov 2018) 
57 Langford et al, p. 6 
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ICESCR, which defines the scope of the treaty obligations, makes no reference to ‘jurisdiction’ or ‘territory’ 
and includes an obligation that state parties ‘take steps, individually and through international assistance 
and co-operation,’ to progressively realize ESC rights.58 In the absence of explicit jurisdictional limitations, 
debate has instead surrounded whether the ICESCR establishes legally binding extraterritorial obligations, 
with many Western states asserting that it imposes only moral rather than legal obligations.59 This position 
is becoming less tenable, as there is emerging consensus about the customary law nature of economic, 
social and cultural rights (particularly minimum core obligations) 60 as well as at least a negative 
extraterritorial obligation to respect ESC rights when a state’s actions have an impact outside of their 
territory,61 although no case law has yet dealt with this matter explicitly.62  
While the ICESCR makes no explicit mention of jurisdiction, there are strong indications that some 
basis of jurisdiction must be satisfied for a violation to be attributed to a State.63 The Maastricht Guidelines 
on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights for example hold that violations are ‘imputable to the 
State within whose jurisdiction they occur,’64 and the ICJ asserted generally in DRC v Uganda that 
‘international human rights instruments are applicable in respect of acts done by a state in the exercise of 
its jurisdiction outside its own territory.’65 Further, the Optional Protocol establishing an individual complaint 
mechanism for ICESCR introduces as an admissibility condition that the applicant be ‘under the jurisdiction’ 
of the State Party that the complaint is filed against.66 Two primary bases of extraterritorial jurisdiction have 
emerged with respect to ESC rights and could be applied in accounting for the extraterritorial human rights 
impact of technology sanctions: 1) a model based on the effective control test and 2) a model based on the 
general obligation to provide ‘international assistance and co-operation.’67 Although the effective control 
                                                     
58 A/HRC/36/44 (2017), para 34 
59 Olivier De Schutter et al, ‘Commentary to the Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the 
Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (2012) 34 Human Rights Quarterly, p. 1094 
60 CESCR General Comment 3, para 10 
61 Langford et al, p. 112 
62 see Threat or use of nuclear weapons, ICJ Reports, 1996 (Advisory Opinion) and ICJ Legal Consequences of the 
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, para 112 for some legal basis 
63 Langford et al, p. 60 
64 International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, 26 January 1997, para 16 
65 Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), 
ICJ, Judgement, 19 December 2005, para 216 
66 CESCR Optional Protocol, art. 2 
67 Langford et al (eds), p. 61 
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model has typically been applied to civil and political rights, given the interrelated and interdependent nature 
of international human rights, it is suggested that the same threshold may also apply to ICESCR 
obligations.68 However, considering that most extraterritorial violations of ESC rights are unlikely to satisfy 
the high threshold that the effective control standard imposes,69 including violations related to economic 
sanctions, its application would be extremely limited and a less restrictive basis for establishing 
extraterritorial state obligations is likely required.70 
In the absence of any specific jurisdictional limitations under the general legal obligations of ICESCR 
and considering the obligation to provide ‘international assistance and cooperation’71 towards the full 
realization of ESC rights, it could be interpreted that State parties assume legal obligations with respect to 
ESC rights that are international or extraterritorial in scope. In the absence of any relevant jurisprudence 
on the matter, the Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the area of Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights describe three separate situations amounting to extraterritorial jurisdiction under 
ICESCR.72 In addition to the aforementioned situation of effective control or authority, the Maastricht 
Principles assert that states have obligations with respect to acts or omissions that ‘bring about foreseeable 
effects on the enjoyment of ESC rights’ within or outside of its territory, even in the absence of effective 
control or authority over a situation or person.73 Lastly, the Maastricht Principles assert that a state may 
have extraterritorial obligations when it is in a position to ‘exercise decisive influence or to take measures 
to realize ESC extraterritorially,74 suggesting that states may also incur positive extraterritorial obligations 
under certain circumstances. 
                                                     
68 Narula, p. 123 
69 Some have proposed a standard based on ‘effective economic control’ to account for situations in which a state 
exercising control over economic policies or markets impacts human rights in a foreign state; see Smita Narula, 
“International Financial Institutions, Transnational Corporations,” in Langford et al (eds), p. 125 
70 Langford et al, p. 8 
71 CESCR General Comment 3, para 14 asserts that this is a legal obligation of all state parties; see also Article 56 of 
the UN Charter and Part I, paragraph 34 of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action 
72 Although the Maastricht Principles are not legally binding, they still carry the authority of significant legal 
expertise in the area of ESC rights; see Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the area of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Principle 9 
73 This would be consistent with the ‘causation model’ in Chapter 2.1.3; see Maastricht Principles, Art. 9(b) and De 
Schutter et al, p. 1109 
74 Maastricht Principles, Principle 9(c) 
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As to the nature of these extraterritorial obligations, the Maastricht Principles assert that states have 
obligations to respect, protect, and fulfill ESC rights extraterritorially.75 This is in accordance with CESCR’s 
position on the matter expressed in relation to multiple rights, such as General Comment 12 on the right to 
food which stresses the ‘essential role of international cooperation’ and that ‘State Parties should take steps 
to respect the enjoyment of the right to food in other countries, to protect that right, to facilitate access to 
food and to provide the necessary aid when required.’76 Thus, states may have both negative and positive 
extraterritorial obligations under the ICESCR. Legal scholars have sometimes proposed a graduated 
approach to the scope of obligations, contingent on the degree of control exercised by the State in another 
territory.77  Given the lack of proximity and control in most cases between a sanctioning state and the target 
state, it is unlikely that there would be strong legal grounds for asserting an obligation to fulfill rights in the 
target state. Thus, the obligations of the sanctioning state would be limited to the obligation to respect and 
protect78 ESC rights. 
Stemming from the obligation of international cooperation, CESCR has clarified that the obligation to 
respect rights extraterritorially ‘requires States parties to refrain from interfering directly or indirectly with 
the enjoyment of the Covenant rights by persons outside their territories.’79 This coincides with the obligation 
under the Maastricht Principles that States must ‘desist from acts and omissions that create a real risk of 
nullifying or impairing the enjoyment’ of ESC rights extraterritorially, and that state responsibility is incurred 
whenever ‘such nullification or impairment is a foreseeable result of their conduct.’80 The Maastricht 
Principles further distinguish between direct and indirect interference under the obligation to respect ESC 
rights. Direct influence refers to situations where the conduct of the state has potential impact on the 
enjoyment of ESC rights ‘without the involvement of any other state or international organization.’81 Indirect 
influence refers to conduct which ‘impairs the ability of another State or international organization to comply’ 
                                                     
75 Maastricht Principles, Principle 3 
76 CESCR General Comment 12, para 36 
77 Langford et al, p. 61  
78 discussed in chapter 2.2 
79 E/C.12/GC/24, para. 29; see also E/C.12/2002/11, para. 31 
80 Maastricht Principles, Principle 13 
81 ibid, Principle 20 
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with its own ESC rights obligations.82 The latter has obvious applicability for detrimental rights impacts 
stemming from economic sanctions and the enforced deprivation of certain goods or services. 
Recognizing the particular relevance of economic sanctions in the context of extraterritorial ESC rights 
obligations, the Maastricht Principles specifically address the duties of sanctioning states under the 
obligation to respect human rights. Principle 22 asserts that States must refrain from adopting sanctions 
which would nullify or impair ‘the enjoyment of economic social and cultural rights,’ especially those 
affecting ‘goods and services essential to meet core obligations.’ This position is consistent with CESCR 
General Comment 8, which sets out certain obligations of ‘parties responsible for the imposition, 
maintenance or implementation of the sanctions, whether it be the international community, an international 
or regional organization, or a State or group of States.’83 This includes the obligation to ensure that the 
measures imposed do not cause ‘disproportionate suffering’ within the targeted country and that any 
negative impact on human rights is limited to the greatest extent possible.84 In accordance with these 
obligations, some argue that states or other organizations must terminate sanctions if their negative impact 
on human rights outweighs the objective being sought.85 
A more recent source of guidelines regarding the extraterritorial application of ESC rights with respect 
to economic sanctions comes from the 2017 report by Special Rapporteur Idriss Jazairy. Although Jazairy 
acknowledges ongoing debates over the extraterritorial application of ICESCR obligations, he concludes 
that sanctions should fall within the ambit of situations that incur extraterritorial obligations, even when the 
sanctioning state exercises no formal jurisdiction or control over the affected population.86 In an annex to 
the 2017 report outlaying ‘Elements for a draft General Assembly declaration on unilateral coercive 
measures and the rule of law,’ Jazairy asserts far-reaching extraterritorial obligations for sanctioning states 
such that ‘in situations where unilateral coercive measures inflict undue sufferings/have an egregious 
human rights impact, on the population of a targeted State…they become clearly illegal and their source 
countries should be called to account.’87 While such a position may have limited support in existing 
                                                     
82 Maastricht Principles, Principle 21 
83 CESCR General Comment 8, E/C.12/1997/8, para 11 
84 GC 8, para 14; see also De Schutter et al, p. 1132  
85 De Schutter et al, p. 1133 
86 A/HRC/36/44, para 33 and 52 
87 A/HRC/36/44, Annex I, para 7 
 15 
jurisprudence, the statement clearly suggests that in the opinion of the Special Rapporteur, any unilateral 
sanction which has substantial adverse impacts on human rights is unlawful and should lead to state 
responsibility.  
 
2.1.3 Causation Model 
 
In support of a more flexible approach to extraterritorial jurisdiction, which may be required to address 
the impact of policies like economic sanctions, Jazairy suggests an approach based on causality88 whereby 
“whether a technical exercise of jurisdiction or not, the type of act instituted by the State will essentially 
dictate who is affected, who falls within its jurisdiction, the rights violated and the extent of obligations 
owed.”89 The principle of causality is related to state responsibility, which is determined by whether, based 
on the facts of a situation, an outcome amounts to a human rights violation that can be causally linked to 
the acts or omissions of a state (factual causality) and whether under the relevant legal requirements such 
unlawful acts or omissions are attributable to the state.90 Under international human rights law, this latter 
requirement has typically carried a high threshold of jurisdiction such as overall or effective control,91 and 
thus extraterritorial responsibility has been difficult to establish.92 However, as Sigrun Skogly points out, 
this leads to a discrepancy between factual causation and attribution, which allows those who factually 
carried out the act or omission to avoid legal responsibility.93 Thus, a revised approach to State 
responsibility more closely linked to factual causality may be necessary.94 
Principles of ‘foreseeability’ and ‘proximity’ have been used in other contexts to establish the scope of 
responsibility for an internationally wrongful act when factual causality can be established,95 and some have 
suggested that these principles could also be applied under international human rights law.96 Proximity is 
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related to the degree to which a harm is directly related to the actions of a state97 while foreseeability refers 
to whether a State knew or should have known that its acts or omissions would result in substantial human 
rights impacts extraterritorially or failed to undertake adequate due diligence to prevent or mitigate a 
violation.98 Perhaps the clearest example of how state responsibility for extraterritorial human rights impact 
could be evaluated on this basis comes from the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) Advisory 
Opinion OC-23/17, in which the Court addressed whether a state party could be held legally responsible 
for extraterritorial human rights violations caused by ‘serious’ or ‘significant’ environmental impact 
attributable to it.99 In its decision, the Court recognized that a person may come under the jurisdiction of a 
state ‘if there is a causal link between the action that occurred within its territory and the negative impact 
on the human rights of persons outside its territory,’100 such that the state ‘exercises effective control over 
the activities that caused the damage.’101 It further suggests that ‘effective control’ in this context would be 
evaluated on the basis of proximity and foreseeability,102 subject to whether a state had knowledge of the 
risk of wrongful acts and the capacity to protect against such effects.103 However, the Advisory Opinion has 
been criticized for its lack of clarity around the minimum threshold of ‘seriousness’ of the damage for 
extraterritorial jurisdiction to be incurred, as well as the precise criteria for establishing a ‘causal link.’104 
Despite this criticism, and while the approach of a regional court of human rights does not have universal 
applicability across other human rights bodies, the IACtHR’s more flexible approach to jurisdiction could 
have implications for future considerations of extraterritorial jurisdiction under both the ICCPR and ICESCR 
which would greatly increase the likelihood of finding State responsibility for the negative human rights 
impact of sanctions. 
 
2.2 Non-State Actors 
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While the above frameworks on extraterritorial jurisdiction may provide a route to state responsibility 
for the negative human rights impact of sanctions (technology-related or otherwise), it must not be forgotten 
that the effects of sanctions may not be the direct result of sanctions policies themselves, but rather the 
decisions of companies to restrict the transfer of certain goods or services in reaction to the sanctions.105 
Thus, the relationship between the state and private actors under its jurisdiction, as well the actions of 
companies independent of the state, merit consideration when attempting to establish accountability. It is 
particularly relevant in the case of technology sanctions given the problem of overcompliance described in 
chapter 1, where companies under the jurisdiction of the sanctioning state, as well as those who do not 
wish to jeopardize their economic activities with said state, deny products and services to the targeted state 
beyond what the sanctions regime would otherwise require.106  
There are a number of reasons why companies engage in overcompliance, including reputational 
concerns of doing business with governments targeted by sanctions107 and substantial financial and legal 
penalties for sanctions infringements.108 However, blame for the practice of overcompliance does not solely 
rest with the companies themselves. The sanctions regimes that States create for businesses to follow are 
often vague, complex, and subject to frequent changes, leaving significant ambiguity over what products 
and services can and cannot be legally exported to the targeted state.109 Thus, companies often take a 
‘risk-averse approach’ and refrain from providing products or services in the targeted State until they receive 
‘explicit authorization in the form of interpretive guidance or specific licenses.’110 As such, addressing the 
problem of overcompliance depends on companies ensuring that they are carrying out lawful business 
activities while not restricting access to vital services and technologies unnecessarily, as well as States 
designing clearer sanctions regimes and exemptions which produce greater legal certainty for companies 
to operate under.  
While states carry duties with respect to companies under their jurisdiction under the obligation to 
protect human rights, companies themselves are not traditionally considered subjects of international law 
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and thus must be regulated via the state.111 However, there is growing recognition that companies carry a 
responsibility to respect human rights, most clearly articulated in the UN Guiding Principles on Business 
and Human Rights.112 While the authority of the Guiding Principles is limited to that of a soft law initiative 
and thus not binding on states, it is asserted that its three pillar framework is reflective of existing 
international legal standards and obligations for states and businesses.113 Further, the Guiding Principles 
have been unanimously endorsed by the UN HRC and incorporated into numerous international regulatory 
frameworks around corporate accountability for human rights violations.114 
Although not completely voluntary, the responsibility of corporate actors to respect human rights is 
softer than the obligation on States to protect human rights. It provides that businesses should refrain from 
infringing on human rights and address adverse impacts linked to their activities through prevention, 
mitigation, and remediation.115 The primary duty described is that of carrying out effective due diligence to 
identify and address negative human rights impacts, which would include assessments of what products 
are subject to export restrictions such as sanctions.116 The extent of the responsibility varies based on the 
size and capacity of the enterprise and should be conducted continuously throughout a business’ 
operations.117 Effective due diligence is necessary for business enterprises to avoid complicity in human 
rights abuses committed by other parties, which could carry liability for civil or criminal wrongs.118 When 
adverse human rights impacts are identified in connection with a business enterprise’s activities, the 
appropriate action that it should take varies according to the nature of its contribution to it and the amount 
of leverage it can exercise in addressing the impact.119 Thus, in evaluating the responsibilities of corporate 
actors in the context of sanctions, they should be understood as variable with respect to their level of 
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connection to the adverse human rights impacts of their activities, but at a minimum, amount to effective 
due diligence when making decisions about how to comply with such measures. 
 In addition to the responsibilities of companies, the first pillar of the UN Guiding Principles framework 
pertains to the duty of States to protect against human rights violations carried out by private actors under 
their jurisdiction or within their territory through effective legislation. States are obligated to ensure that laws 
and policies governing the business sector ‘do not constrain but enable business respect for human rights,’ 
and ‘provide effective guidance’ to businesses on how to respect human rights.120 The Commentary to this 
principle also asserts that States have a duty to review whether the laws governing business enterprises 
‘provide the necessary coverage in light of evolving circumstances and whether…they provide an 
environment conducive to business respect for human rights.’121 Thus, it would seem that based on this 
framework, States in designing sanctions and coercive measures have a duty to ensure that such policies 
enable businesses to carry out their duty to respect human rights, to provide guidance on compliance to 
businesses operating under the sanctions regime, and to revise such sanctions when necessary. This duty 
to protect would also extend to states acting as members of multilateral institutions.122  
Under the obligation to protect against abuses carried out by non-state actors, while it is asserted that 
States are not directly responsible for the abuses of third parties,123 their acts may be indirectly 
attributable124 to the State when it fails to take the required steps to ‘prevent, investigate, punish and 
redress’ such abuses.125 Thus, indirect attribution of extraterritorial human rights violations would be based 
on whether the state conducted appropriate due diligence to avoid foreseeable violations by non-state 
actors, proportionate to its capacity to influence the corporations implicated.126 Vassilis Tzevelekos 
suggests that standards of due diligence might also be dependent on and proportional to the effectiveness 
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of the control exerted by the state over a particular situation.127 While many aspects of this argument for 
the indirect attribution of extraterritorial breaches of human rights to the host state remain unclear and 
untested, there appears to be emerging consensus amongst legal scholars that such an obligation is 
included under a state’s positive extraterritorial obligation to protect human rights.128 Applied in the context 
of technology sanctions, this approach offers a solid basis for establishing state responsibility when private 
actors, in complying with such sanctions, infringe on the rights of individuals in the targeted state. Due 
diligence in this scenario might amount to issuing general licenses, revising or providing greater clarity on 
sanctions policies, or directly regulating the actions of private actors under the state’s jurisdiction to ensure 
that their sanctions regimes do not lead to infringements on human rights.129 
 
3.  Legal Analysis 
 
 As demonstrated above, there are a number of challenges in applying the existing international 
human rights law framework to the matter of sanctions. The current understanding and existing 
jurisprudence surrounding extraterritorial human rights obligations, the lack of clarity around the scope of 
ESC rights, specifically the nature of the obligation of ‘international cooperation and assistance,’ as well as 
the lack of clear responsibilities for corporations and host states with respect to human rights, means that 
very few of the relevant areas of law provide a clear route to state responsibility for the adverse human 
rights impact of sanctions. Added to this, the two international covenants on human rights were adopted at 
a time when the importance of modern digital technologies could not have been envisioned, and as legal 
scholars have pointed out, technological developments tend to outpace the evolution of the law, leaving it 
outdated and reactive with respect to technological advances.130 
Although there is currently no legally binding document explicitly addressing the relationship between 
international human rights law and modern technologies, there has been some development in this area 
through other sources, including the former UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the 
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right to freedom of opinion and expression, who in a 2011 report stated that ‘the Internet has become an 
indispensable tool for realizing a range of human rights’131 as well as for ‘for full participation in political, 
cultural, social and economic life.’132 This statement has formed the basis for further developments 
regarding human rights in the digital age, culminating in a 2016 HRC resolution passed by consensus which 
affirmed that ‘the same rights people have offline must also be protected online.’133 Applying this guidance 
and other rights-specific formulations as to how the content of specific human rights might be interpreted in 
light of modern technologies, the following chapter will evaluate the human rights impact of technology 
sanctions as reported in the context of US sanctions in Iran, Syria, and Sudan with regard to both civil and 
political as well as economic, social and cultural rights. Following from the discussion in chapter 2 covering 
the extent of the legal obligations owed by the sanctioning state(s) or international organization to 
individuals in the targeted state, chapter 3 will further endeavor to establish whether such impact may 
amount to a violation of human rights law incurring state responsibility.  
 
3.1 Civil and Political Rights 
Recognized in the aforementioned 2016 HRC resolution on the promotion, protection and enjoyment 
of human rights on the Internet,134 modern technologies are particularly important with respect to the right 
to freedom of expression,135 the right to privacy,136 and the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and 
association.137 While established as separate articles of ICCPR, these rights are very much 
interdependent138 and collectively vital for the exercise of many other human rights.139 Noted in chapter 1, 
the importance of ICT tools for the exercise of this set of rights within the context of the Iranian Green 
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Movement and Arab Spring was the primary concern of many who suggested that sanctions may have 
adverse impacts on human rights.140 
 
3.1.1 Freedom of Expression 
One of the primary rights implicated in technology sanctions, particularly with regards to their impacts 
on access to the Internet and the tools and resources that it provides, is the right to freedom of expression. 
The right to freedom of expression and opinion, guaranteed in ICCPR Article 19, is recognized as a uniquely 
important right to uphold, described by the HRC as ‘the foundation stone for every free and democratic 
society.’141 Freedom of expression, which can be limited only under certain exceptional circumstances,142 
includes the right to seek, receive, and impart information ‘regardless of frontiers’ in orally, in writing, in 
print, or ‘through any other media’.143 The formulation of the right thus introduces an inherent connection 
between the accessibility of information and the realization of the freedom of expression,144 and protects 
both the form and means of expression and dissemination.145 The CCPR has also highlighted the important 
role of the press or other media in ensuring the protection of this right146 and implies that the right includes 
the protection of a free press which is able to inform public opinion ‘without censorship or restraint,’ as well 
as the right of all peoples to receive information from the media.147 It is also well-recognized that Article 
19’s accounting for ‘any other media’ means that the right was drafted with the foresight to accommodate 
new mediums through which the right might be realized.148 In the modern era, this expansiveness has 
typically been applied when considering the right to freedom of expression with respect to the Internet, 
recognized in both HRC General Comment 34 and even earlier in the 2011 Special Rapporteur report on 
the right to freedom of expression and opinion as a ‘revolutionary’ medium unlike any other.149 However, 
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there remains a lack of clarity regarding the scope and content of the right when it comes to the Internet 
and other ICTs.150 
In writing on technology sanctions, digital rights advocates and other members of civil society frequently 
discuss the effects of such restrictive measures on the right to freedom of expression, often arguing that 
they amount to an impairment of the right.151 This is typically in the context of reports from Iran, Syria, and 
Sudan that US sanctions have resulted in severe limitations on the population’s ability to access certain 
tools and resources made available through the Internet, viewed by many as essential to the realization of 
the right to freedom of expression.152 They note the heightened importance of these tools within repressive 
regimes, where the right to freedom of opinion and expression is already limited by the national government 
through censorship, surveillance, or other means.153 As activist Dalia Haj-Omar has stated in an appeal to 
lift US technology sanctions, the Internet is the ‘the only platform for free civic engagement in Sudan.’154  
The former Special Rapporteur on the right to freedom of expression has acknowledged that in contexts 
where there is very little independent media, ICT platforms ‘enable individuals to share critical views and to 
find objective information.’155 For example in Iran, where over 60% of the population are Internet users,156 
the government exercises strict control over the media, both online and traditional forms.157 Likely for this 
reason, Iran has one of the most active blogospheres in the world,158 and its 2009 Green Revolution was 
largely organized over online communications platforms like the end-to-end encrypted Telegram, which at 
one time had over 40 million active users in Iran.159 Recognizing this, the government now blocks platforms 
like Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, and Telegram, in an attempt to expand its control over the information 
space in the country.160 This control is facilitated by Iran’s development of the National Information Network 
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(NIN), a state-controlled network which, in addition to numerous security issues and content restrictions, 
separates domestic internet traffic from international, enabling the government to sever access to the global 
internet at will.161 
Given the control that states may exercise over the media, access to independent sources of 
information available on the global internet and social media platforms are vital for people to share and 
receive information freely. Tech savvy users in Iran have been able to access these platforms through 
virtual private networks (VPNs) or products like the popular Toronto-based Psiphon (not subject to US 
sanctions) which enable users to circumvent government filters and censors, as well as conceal their online 
activity.162 However, VPNs are increasingly difficult to access in states which are subject to US sanctions. 
As a result of the sanctions, US-based companies like Amazon and Google have blocked access for 
Iranians to some of their products, notably Amazon Web Service (AWS), the Apple App Store, as well as 
the Google Play Store and Google App Engine (GAE).163 AWS is one of the world’s most extensive cloud 
computing platforms and was reportedly used by Iranian developers to create open-source VPNs for public 
consumption.164 Amazon’s sanctions-related blocking of this product will force developers of all tools, not 
just VPNs, to use state digital services provided by the NIN, which will only strengthen the government’s 
ability to control Iranians’ access to the internet and reduce the possibility for circumvention.165 Similar to a 
VPN is another popular circumvention tool, Tor, which is widely used across the globe by Internet users 
seeking to evade government censorship and surveillance, using a technique called “domain fronting” to 
conceal network traffic from surveillance and bypass government censors.166 Unfortunately, domain fronting 
relies on the GAE, which is no longer available in Iran and thus leaves Tor as yet another unavailable tool 
for gaining access to diverse sources of information and maintaining some form of free and open media.167  
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The impacts of sanctions-related restrictions on US technology products and services extends far 
beyond VPNs. Iranian individuals and companies commonly use cloud computing platforms like AWS and 
GAE to host their websites and online services as opposed to the NIN, meaning that much of the 
independent Internet will now be forced onto the heavily censored government-run network.168 As a further 
consequence, other international websites that are hosted on AWS may no longer be available in the 
country, reducing the available online resources for the Iranian population.169 Additionally, prior to the 
issuing of General Licenses by the US revising sanctions regimes in Syrian, Sudan and Iran, the effects of 
the sanctions were much farther reaching, prohibiting the sale of both software and hardware, including 
antivirus software, secure chat applications, laptops, and cell phones.170 Thus, in each of these cases and 
to varying degrees, the impact of sanctions on the accessibility of the Internet as means of both receiving 
and disseminating information has been reported, and some argue that limiting the Internet in this way, and 
depriving individuals of the tools they need to access it, interferes with the right to freedom of expression.171 
In order to evaluate this assertion, this section will consider whether access to the Internet is protected 
under the right to freedom of opinion and expression, what the scope and content of the obligations might 
be with respect to the Internet, and whether the reported effects of technology sanctions amount to a breach 
of those obligations given the models of extraterritorial jurisdiction discussed in chapter 2. 
The clearest starting point for this analysis is HRC General Comment 34, which following from Article 
19’s inclusion of the phrase ‘any other media’ in reference to the protected means of expression, asserts 
that this includes all forms of audio-visual as well as electronic and internet-based modes of expression.’172 
It further states that parties to the ICCPR should ‘take all necessary steps to foster the independence of 
these new media and to ensure access of individuals thereto,’173 suggesting that state parties carry certain 
obligations with respect to the people’s ability to access these technologies given their importance as a 
means of realizing the right to freedom of opinion and expression. While some have extended this argument 
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to advance the notion of an independent right to the Internet,174 it would seem that given the lack of 
consensus around such a claim and the content of the proposed right, proceeding on the basis that the 
Internet is an important and protected means of realizing the right to freedom of expression is the correct 
approach.  
Freedom of expression, like many other civil and political rights, is conceived of in primarily negative 
terms, establishing acts or omissions of the state which might amount to a violation of the right. General 
Comment 34 accordingly establishes a negative obligation with respect to Internet access, such that ‘any 
restrictions on the operation of websites, blogs or any other internet-based, electronic or other such 
information dissemination system, including systems to support such communication, such as internet 
service providers or search engines,’ must be compatible with the clause on acceptable limitations.175 
Further, ‘permissible restrictions generally should be content-specific,’ rather than generic.176 This has been 
elaborated on in the ECtHR case, Yildirim v Turkey, in which the Court ruled that the government’s blocking 
of all Turkish-based Internet users from the hosting platform Google Sites in order to remove one site facing 
criminal proceedings, was unjustified and a violation Article 10 on freedom of expression.177 While the Court 
acknowledged that restrictions on access to certain contents of the Internet may be permissible, it 
recognized that Google Sites constitutes a means of exercising the right to freedom of expression ‘in light 
of present day conditions’ and found that the effects of the government blocking of Google Sites in its 
entirety produced arbitrary effects.178 It also asserted that, as the Internet is now a ‘principle means’ by 
which people exercise the right to freedom of expression, any blocking measure is bound to influence the 
accessibility of the Internet and engage State responsibility under Article 10.179 Later cases of Kalda v. 
Estonia180 and Jankovski v. Lithuania,181 lend further support to this decision, asserting that given the unique 
                                                     
174 Coccoli, p. 243 
175 GC 34, para 43 
176 ibid 
177 Yildirim v. Turkey, App no 3111/10 (ECtHR, 18 December 2012), para 69 
178 ibid, para 67 
179 ibid, para 54 
180 Kalda v. Estonia, Application no. 17429/10 of 19 January 2016, para 50 
181 Jankovski v. Lithuania, Application no. 21575/08 of 17 January 2017, para 40 
 27 
nature of online content and means of dissemination, there may be no ‘alternative means’ with the same 
capabilities available to individuals affected by a blocking measure.182 
Certainly, an argument could be made that blocking access to multiple cloud computing platforms and 
communications platforms, as US sanctions have reportedly done in Iran, Syria and Sudan, is similar to 
that of blocking access to Google Sites as considered in Yildirim v Turkey, and if carried out within US 
territory, may similarly amount to a breach of state obligations. Both Google Sites and the tools restricted 
under US sanctions influence the accessibility of the Internet and thus may be protected from arbitrary 
interference under ECHR Article 10, and probably by extension ICCPR Article 19. However, while the above 
considers the obligations of the territorial state to refrain from arbitrarily blocking substantial parts of the 
Internet for its citizens, in the context of technology sanctions what must be addressed is whether the 
sanctioning state, in imposing restrictions on access to products which could allow for and contribute to a 
freer and more open Internet in Iran, may violate its obligations with respect to the right to freedom of 
opinion and expression extraterritorially.  
As discussed in chapter 2.1.1, under the emerging recognition of extraterritorial jurisdiction on the basis 
of one state exercising power or control over the enjoyment of particular civil and political rights in a foreign 
state (the ‘impact model’),183 as well as the ‘causation model’ asserted by the IACtHR,184 it is conceivable 
that a state imposing sanctions on technology which impact access to the Internet as a means of exercising 
the right to freedom of expression might breach its extraterritorial obligations under Article 19. Certainly, if 
the sanctioning state were in control of the Internet service providers in the targeted state and prohibited 
their operation, or itself effected the blocking of massive online platforms like Facebook, Telegram, or 
Twitter, a strong case could be made that that state exercised ‘power or control’ over the right to freedom 
of expression and opinion, as is required under the impact model. Likewise, under the causation model, it 
could be said that the US exercised effective control over a policy which directly caused serious and 
foreseeable harms that negatively impacted the right to freedom of expression. Given the relative 
importance of these particular products and services for accessing the Internet and receiving and 
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disseminating information online, enforcing a measure which restricted access to them would likely satisfy 
either of these more flexible bases of jurisdiction. As such, a much stronger argument could be made for a 
violation of US extraterritorial obligations with respect to earlier sanctions regimes prior to the issuing of 
general licenses, which reportedly had much more far-reaching effects, targeting the majority of hardware 
and software with US components.185  
In the abovementioned cases of policies which amount to the blocking of certain platforms used in the 
development of VPNs, it seems less likely that this would not meet the threshold of control over the right 
required to assert extraterritorial obligations under the impact model,186 nor the undefined ‘seriousness’ 
threshold of the causation model. While important tools for circumventing censors, particularly in places 
where governments exercise significant control over the means of disseminating and accessing 
information, control over the availability of certain VPNs and other tools linked to particular cloud computing 
platforms would likely not amount to power or control over access to the Internet as a means of realizing 
the right to freedom of expression. The impact would also not be direct, as sanctions are not themselves 
blocking access to the Internet, but rather heightening the effects of Iranian filters and censors by limiting 
options for bypassing them and accessing the global Internet. As evidenced by the existence of tools like 
Psiphon and other national alternatives,187 although some of these may be less secure, it would appear 
that there are suitable ‘alternative means’ of accessing the Internet which render VPNs and other products 
and services originating from the sanctioning state non-essential for the realization of the right.  
While the above analysis focuses on a state’s obligation not to interfere with access to the Internet, 
according to a joint declaration published by the UN Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(OSCE) states may also have positive obligations under the right to freedom of expression ‘to facilitate 
universal access to the Internet.’188 Although this declaration is not legally binding, it still carries the support 
of experts in this rights area from each of the major regional human rights systems and has been restated, 
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albeit to a lesser extent, in other UN resolutions189 and General Comment 34.190 However, such an 
obligation, according to Martinovic, would be subject to the degree of effective control exercised in the 
targeted state.191 Sanctioning states, not often exercising effective control in the targeted state, would thus 
rarely incur such positive obligations. That being said, the HRC has encouraged States to ‘take steps to 
prevent abuse abroad by business enterprises within their jurisdiction.’192 While companies like Google, 
Amazon, and Apple have justified their actions in limiting certain technologies on compliance with US 
sanctions, as some have argued, platforms such as AWS and GAE likely are not prohibited under the 
current sanctions regimes, yet the companies have still elected to block them in targeted states.193 Part of 
this may be due to the lack of policy clarity provided by the sanctioning state as to what should be restricted 
under the current sanctions regimes and a failure of the state to take positive action to ensure that non-
state actors do not infringe on the rights of the targeted state’s population. As discussed in chapter 2.2, if 
the above were true, a case could be made for the indirect attribution of extraterritorial human rights 
violations if the sanctioning state failed to satisfy its due diligence obligations.194 This would have to be 
evaluated in light of whether individual private actors could be directly linked to an infringement of human 
rights in the target state, and whether the sanctioning state took all reasonable measures to protect against 
the infringement given the circumstances of the particular situation.195 Factors such as the number of 
general licenses passed to clarify and loosen sanctions restrictions, communications and responsiveness 
to the concerns of the private sector regarding sanctions compliance, the reliability and availability of impact 
reports, and engagement with relevant stakeholders might all be considered in determining state 
responsibility.196 
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Finally, considering that private companies within the ICT industry have been referred to as 
‘indispensable to the contemporary exercise of freedom of expression,’197 and the fact that their actions can 
have significant impact on the exercise of the right, private actors may also have responsibilities with 
respect to the effects of technology sanctions.198 Companies should thus ensure that in complying with 
technology sanctions, they carry out effective due diligence in order to identify, prevent and mitigate 
potentially adverse impacts on the right to freedom of expression.199 While in some cases, their ability to do 
this depends on improvements or revisions of sanctions policies, in certain circumstances, technology 
companies have clearly practiced overcompliance to the detriment of human rights. For instance, in 
December 2018, the platform Slack banned all users of its product who had ever connected to the platform 
from an Iranian IP address, despite the fact that these individuals may be fully entitled to use the platform 
under the US sanctions regime.200 If true, this sweeping response to sanctions certainly would likely have 
the effect restricting access to users who were legally entitled to use its services and would amount to a 
failure of that company to uphold its responsibility to respect human rights.  
 
3.1.2 Right to Privacy 
Sanctions have also had the effect of severely hampering the ability of target populations to 
communicate securely and privately, a necessary component of the right to freedom of expression and 
opinion and a fundamental principle of the right to privacy, protected under ICCPR Article 17. The right to 
privacy includes the freedom from arbitrary interference by state authorities or private actors with one’s 
family life, personal relationships, and most relevant in this context, correspondence.201 It is considered an 
enabling right, in that is an important condition for the exercise of other Convention rights such as freedom 
of expression and opinion as well as freedom of assembly and association.202 States carry both a negative 
obligation to refrain from such arbitrary or unlawful attacks on privacy as well as a positive obligation to 
                                                     
197 A/HRC/35/22, para 47 
198 see chapter 2.2 
199 UNGPs, Principle 17 
200 “Joint submission to the Universal Periodic Review of the Islamic Republic of Iran by ARTICLE 19 and Access 
Now,” (April 4, 2019), para 45 
201 ICCPR Article 17(1) 
202 see UNGA Res. 68/167; see also A/HRC/13/37 and A/HRC/RES/20/8 
 31 
adopt ‘legislative or other measures to give effect to the prohibition’ of such interferences.203 In order for 
the right to privacy to be upheld, ‘the integrity and confidentiality of correspondence should be guaranteed,’ 
and ‘correspondence should be delivered to the addressee without interception and without being opened 
or otherwise read.’204 Thus, the right serves to limit a state’s ability to monitor and surveil its citizens and 
protects a ‘zone of privacy’ which enables the enjoyment of other rights and an individual’s ability to 
participate freely in political, economic, social, and cultural life.205 The restriction of arbitrariness thus 
establishes that any interference with the right must established by law, necessary to achieve a legitimate 
aim, and proportional.206  
In the case studies examined, the impact of US sanctions on the right to privacy primarily concerns 
restrictions on access to encrypted communications software and other personal security tools, which 
enable individuals to protect themselves against unlawful surveillance. Encryption refers to the scrambling 
of data so that only intended recipients are able to access it and is one of the most popular tools for 
protecting the security of individuals and their communications online.207 Prior to its blocking by the 
government in 2018, Iranians had primarily relied on the tool Telegram to send end-to-end encrypted 
messages to bypass government surveillance and communicate freely.208 As an alternative, Iranians could 
turn to Signal, a more secure application used globally to evade surveillance and maintain private 
communications.209 However, Signal relies on ‘domain fronting’ and uses the Google App Engine which is 
restricted for Iranian Internet users.210 While not having access to Signal might not be seen as a significant 
absence in Iranian society, combined with the regimes successful blocking of Telegram and WhatsApp,211 
the two most common encrypted communications tools, Iranians are left with few options for protecting their 
privacy while sending messages online. Sanctions have also reportedly interfered with security features 
such as two-factor authentication (2FA), which adds an additional layer of verification to prevent 
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unauthorized logins of user accounts. For instance, Google bars the distribution and promotion of its Titan 
key for 2FA in countries under US sanctions and users have also reported being unable to access Twitter’s 
2FA system which uses SMS messages sent to cellphone number.212 
A common feature of technology sanctions is that they often force individuals within targeted countries 
to rely on alternatives which are less protective of human rights and make them more vulnerable to 
surveillance and censorship.213 Thus, when US technology and security updates are not available, it 
facilitates repression from authoritarian regimes and makes it easier for them to compromise the security 
and privacy of vulnerable individuals. For instance, seeking circumvention tools to bypass government 
censors, individuals in Syria turned to a proxy software called Simurgh, which could easily be attained and 
shared on portable discs.214 However, given the unofficial nature of this product and insecure distribution, 
some versions of this tool were being circulated with a malicious ‘backdoor’ which would allow third parties 
to access user information and activity.215 Throughout the anti-government protests of the Arab Spring, 
Syrian activists were reportedly subject to many such malware attacks because they also could not access 
the Google Play Store or Apple App Store to download legitimate versions of apps, instead turning to 
unknown or unofficial sources of these products.216 The sophisticated nature of the Syrian regime’s cyber 
operations allowed government actors to exploit this unofficial app market, which arose as a consequence 
of sanctions, to seed malicious software and target activists and dissidents.  
This increased susceptibility to surveillance for individuals in states targeted by technology sanctions, 
often combined with the heightened surveillance and censorship efforts of the targeted state on its 
population, can have dire consequences. In Iran, online targeting of journalists, human rights activists, and 
other members of civil society is widespread.217 Arrests and severe sentences are common for the country’s 
active bloggers and online critics, some even receiving death sentences for their online posts, convicted of 
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charges such as “insulting the Supreme Leader” and “propaganda against the regime.”218 Lacking access 
to encryption tools and other forms of secure communication, and forced to use more vulnerable tools in 
lieu of international tools restricted under US sanctions, this lack of privacy has a chilling effect on society 
and democratic participation.219 As a result, many individuals including journalists and human rights 
defenders refrain from organizing or expressing themselves out of fear of being targeted by the regime for 
their views and acts.220 Thus, repeated interferences with right to privacy, as in the case of targeted state 
surveillance, has effects not only on the individuals whose correspondences are intercepted, but also on 
society as a whole and their right to freedom of expression.221  
It is clear that in many of the states subject to US sanctions, the right to privacy is increasingly under 
threat, as are other rights which privacy enables such as the right to freedom of expression and opinion.222 
Given that in a number of reported cases in the countries examined, correspondences are intercepted and 
analyzed by the state without legitimate reason and without proper regulation or oversight,223 it would 
appear that in many instances, interferences with the right would be held to be arbitrary or unlawful under 
international human rights law.224 Recognized in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, the protections against 
arbitrary interference with correspondence under the right to privacy extends to digital correspondence,225 
and HRC General Comment 16 even goes so far as to assert that all surveillance of conversations, including 
electronic, ‘should be prohibited.’226 While this statement seems to ignore that the right specifically prohibits 
arbitrary or unlawful interference, as well as jurisprudence holding surveillance to be lawful in certain 
cases,227 it reinforces that surveillance of digital correspondence is fundamentally at odds with the right to 
privacy and must be strictly limited.  
In accordance with this, the 2017 HRC report titled ‘The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age’ asserts an 
important role for the security of technologies and, in particular, the availability of encryption for the 
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protection of the user against such unlawful interference.228 Furthermore, the broad concept of 
‘correspondence’ in Article 17 would seem to allow for new manifestations of the scope of protection of the 
right to privacy. Thus, in the era of electronic and networked communications through email, peer-to-peer 
messaging applications, and platforms like Twitter, the right to privacy should encompass protections 
against interferences with these forms of correspondence through encryption or other tools.229 Noting the 
interdependence between the right to privacy and the right to freedom of expression, the two most recent 
Special Rapporteurs on the latter right have asserted the importance of encryption technology specifically, 
as it can act as a ‘zone of privacy online to hold opinions and exercise freedom of expression without 
arbitrary and unlawful interference or attacks.’230 Following from this argument, a 2016 UNESCO report 
titled ‘Human Rights and Encryption’ links encryption to the protection of ‘uninhibited communications,’ 231 
which have been recognized by the ECHR as a precondition for freedom of communication.232 The report 
bases its argument for the legal protection of encryption on the notion that encryption is a second level right 
and a required precondition for the right to privacy and freedom of expression to be realized.233 Thus, it 
argues that ‘restriction of the availability and effectiveness of encryption as such constitutes an interference 
with the freedom of expression and the right to privacy…Therefore, it has to be assessed in terms of legality, 
necessity and purpose.’234 
As illustrated, there is strong support for considering access to encryption and the necessary tools for 
anonymity as a fundamental component of the right to privacy in the digital age, as well as the right to 
freedom of expression and opinion. However, the extent of state obligations with respect to these 
technologies seems dependent on the particular conception of encryption under the right to privacy. For 
instance, the UNESCO report argues that encryption is not just a means of protecting the right to privacy 
online, but a necessary precondition for the right to be protected in digital spaces.235 Thus, states may have 
a negative obligation to refrain from imposing any restrictions on the accessibility of encryption as this would 
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amount to an interference with the right to privacy. Alternatively, under a more straight-forward reading of 
ICCPR Article 17, given that the right only explicitly prohibits ‘arbitrary or unlawful interference’ with an 
individual’s privacy, the sanctioning state might only be said to indirectly contribute to a violation of the right 
to privacy in the target state by restricting access to the tools individuals need to protect their privacy and 
security. Thus, providing access to encryption and security tools may only amount to a positive obligation 
to ensure the right to privacy by enabling individuals to protect themselves against unlawful interferences 
by other actors.236 
Under both interpretations, as in the above section, the argument of whether the sanctioning state may 
have committed a violation of its obligations rests on whether or not it exercises extraterritorial jurisdiction 
in the targeted state. If one takes the approach advocated by UNESCO, that any interference caused by 
sanctions on the accessibility or effectiveness of encryption amounts to a breach of a state’s negative 
obligations to respect the right to privacy,237 a violation seems plausible under either the impact or causation 
models. Subject to a determination of seriousness of the impact or harm and the foreseeability of this 
impact, sanctions-related restrictions on encryption tools would likely amount to a direct interference with 
the right to privacy under this interpretation of the right. As in the previous section, under the impact and 
causation models, the existence of substantial impact amounting to power or control over the right to privacy 
would also need to be considered in terms of the availability of an alternative means for encryption as well 
as the due diligence exercised by the state imposing such sanctions.238 Alternatively, if protecting access 
to encryption is a positive obligation of state parties to the ICCPR, it could be said that denying access to 
such tools in the targeted state, as US sanctions have been shown to do, also amounts to a violation of a 
state’s positive obligations to secure and ensure the right to privacy.239 However, as noted previously, even 
those who advocate for a broader understanding of extraterritorial jurisdiction have suggested that such 
obligations are limited to situations where the state exercises effective control.240  
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Private actors are also implicated in the effects of sanctions on the right of privacy, as it often their 
decision to refuse to update or suspend the provision of services or products to targeted states. In some 
cases, it may not be entirely clear whether a certain product is restricted under a particular sanctions regime, 
as seems to be the case with the Google Titan key, which was restricted based on internal decisions at 
Google to bar distribution of these products in countries under US sanctions.241 As discussed in chapter 
2.2, if this lack of policy clarity leads to an interference with the right to privacy and is the result of negligence 
on the part of the sanctioning state with respect to its due diligence obligation, this might provide grounds 
for the indirect attribution of an extraterritorial human rights violation to the state.242 Additionally, under their 
responsibility to respect human rights throughout their global operations, companies should endeavor to 
provide vital privacy and encryption tools where possible,243 as well as collect feedback from affected 
stakeholders as to the effects of sanctions and the absence of certain products and services on their 
rights.244 Under the responsibility to carry out due diligence, corporations should also engage in discussions 
internally about how to respond to sanctions policies, its implications for the security of their products, and 
the appropriate way to respond to minimize or negate such impacts.245 
 
 
3.1.3 Freedom of Assembly and Association 
 
 Given its interrelated and interdependent nature with the rights discussed in the previous two 
sections, the right to freedom of assembly and association, protected under ICCPR Articles 21 and 22, is 
also implicated in the impact of technology sanctions. Together, the rights protect the freedom of individuals 
to associate with others and engage in peaceful assembly, subject only to limitations prescribed by law and 
necessary in a democratic society.246 The right of peaceful assembly is recognized by the HRC as the 
‘foundation of a system of government based on democracy, human rights and pluralism’247 and imposes 
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an obligation on state parties to accommodate, and indeed facilitate, such assemblies.248 As the UN has 
noted, both the right to privacy249 as well as the freedom of expression250 are integral to the enjoyment of 
the right to freedom of association and assembly. If individuals do not have the tools to communicate and 
share information or if they feel their privacy is threatened by surveillance or other forms of monitoring, they 
are unlikely to be able to exercise freely their right to association or assembly. The exercise of the right has 
also been linked with modern technologies, which have fundamentally changed the ways public assemblies 
are organized and carried out, presenting both risks and possibilities.251 For example, certain social media 
platforms may be tremendously useful for coordinating assemblies, while online surveillance may expose 
greater numbers of people to targeting and persecution for their participation.252 
As such, many of the sanctions-related effects discussed in Chapter 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 would likely have 
serious implications for the right to freedom of assembly and association. For one, the ability to freely share 
and access information as protected under the right to freedom of expression is also vital for individuals to 
organize peaceful assemblies.253 Thus, limitations on secure communication tools and VPNs, which enable 
individuals in repressive regimes to access social media like Facebook and Twitter as well as other digital 
sources of information, would have an impact on the right to freedom of assembly as well. Certainly, there 
are other means of disseminating information about an assembly, however, particularly, where the state 
exercises substantial control over communications infrastructure, it is unlikely that organizing through 
phone calls or text messages will be a secure mode of bringing individuals together, not to mention the 
inefficiency of this method compared to other mass communications tools like Facebook or Telegram.254 
Telegram for example allows for secure group messaging between thousands of individuals at once, 
enabling the organization of large-scale assemblies while protecting against unlawful breaches of the right 
to privacy.255 As for other alternatives, while use of social media like “Hotgram” and “Telegram Talaee” in 
Iran might technically provide the tools to facilitate assemblies, the fact that such products are tied to the 
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NIN compromises the security of gathering organized on those platforms and enhances the ability of the 
Iranian regime to suppress the opposition’s ability to mobilize against it.256 Further, when sanctions deprive 
individuals of security and encryption tools, it not only impacts their digital privacy, but heightens the risk to 
themselves and other of being targeted for their association with a protest or activist network. The digital 
domain is now a primary battlefield for governments targeting members of civil society, as they may be able 
to gain access to an individual’s contacts and target their associates, suppress movement organizers, and 
conduct surveillance operations at mass gatherings.257 This may lead to both direct interferences with 
rights, including the right to freedom of assembly and association, as well as a chilling effect on the exercise 
of this right across society as whole.  
Still in its draft stage, General Comment 37 on the right to peaceful assembly notes that considerations 
of the role that technology plays in exercising the right must ‘inform an assessment of the legal framework 
required to give full effect to article 21 today,’258 suggesting that future interpretations as to the content of 
the right to peaceful assembly will more specifically address the role of technology. In 2019, the Special 
Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association suggested the essential nature 
of online platforms like Facebook and Twitter for the right to peaceful assembly, referring to them as 
‘gatekeepers to people’s ability to enjoy the rights of peaceful assembly and association…and participate 
in the democratic space.’259 The Special Rapporteur also appears to argue for the role of digital technology, 
not just as means of facilitating assembly and association in person, but also as a virtual space where the 
right can be exercised.260 Thus, while assembly has generally been understood as a physical gathering of 
people, human rights protections ‘may  apply  to  analogous interactions taking place online.’261 As such, 
free and open access to virtual spaces could be asserted as a necessary protection under the right to 
peaceful assembly in addition to the traditional understanding of the right as pertaining to assemblies in 
physical public spaces. In light of this, the Special Rapporteur has called on states to ‘ensure that everyone 
can access and use the Internet to exercise these rights and that online associations and assemblies are 
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facilitated in accordance with international human rights standards.’262 Taken together, the above 
statements seem to assert a positive obligation on state parties to ensure and facilitate assemblies online 
by providing access to an open and free Internet. 
It is thus clear that the Internet and other digital tools are widely recognized as integral to the exercise 
of the right to freedom of assembly as well as standalone spaces in which assemblies can take place. 
Following the analysis of ‘alternative means’ in chapter 3.1.1, it would likely be the case that other means 
of organizing and assembling would not be considered suitable alternatives given the unique capabilities 
of the Internet to provide an efficient and cost effective form of mass communication, as well as a separate 
digital space for vulnerable groups to assemble free of public persecution. Furthermore, based on the above 
analysis, it appears that states may have both a negative obligation not to interfere with access to these 
digital tools as well as a positive obligation to facilitate access to these tools for individuals within their 
territory or under their jurisdiction.  
As to the question of extraterritorial jurisdiction in the context of technology sanctions, roughly the same 
arguments established above in relation to circumvention and encryption tools would apply here as well. 
Considering that what would likely be protected under the right to freedom of association and assembly is 
access to a free and open Internet as a space for both organizing and participating in peaceful assemblies, 
the reported effects of US technology sanctions as discussed in chapter 3.1.1 and 3.1.2  would likely not 
satisfy the threshold of ‘power or control’ over access to the Internet, nor would the impact be ‘serious’ 
enough to constitute an extraterritorial violation under either the causation or impact model of jurisdiction. 
However, given that social platforms like Facebook, Twitter, and Telegram might be recognized as 
equivalent to physical spaces of assembly,263 if technology sanctions were to affect a complete shutdown 
of one or all of these platforms for which few alternatives exist, an argument could be made that the 
sanctioning state does in fact exercise ‘power or control’ over freedom of assembly online or exercises 
effective control over the act which directly causes the interference with the right. While such effects have 
not been reported in any of the case studies examined or otherwise, if sanctions had this impact, it would 
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likely amount to a breach of the sanctioning state’s extraterritorial obligations not to interfere with the right 
to freedom of assembly and association. 
The current Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association has 
also noted that digital technology companies have played a significant role in creating challenges for 
individuals and organizations seeking to exercise these rights online as well as offline.264 As such, he 
asserts that these companies ‘must commit to respect freedoms of peaceful assembly and association and 
carry out due diligence to ensure that they do not cause, contribute to or become complicit in a violation of 
these rights.’265 Thus, while companies would not be held legally liable for refusing to provide certain 
services to targeted states on the basis of sanctions, they should adhere to the Principle 17 of the UNGPs 
in identifying risks to stakeholders and their rights to peaceful assembly and association, and communicate 
with their home government about such risks and impacts. As discussed in chapter 3.1.1, if companies 
such as Facebook or Twitter were under a state’s jurisdiction and decided to restrict access to their services 
in response to sanctions (which as mentioned might amount to a breach of the right to freedom of assembly 
and association), this infringement might be indirectly attributable to the state subject to an assessment of 
its exercise of due diligence to respond to and remedy the illicit conduct of the non-state actor. 
 
3.2 Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 
 
 In addition to their importance for the exercise of civil and political rights in the digital age, the 
Internet and other ICTs are also recognized as an enabler of the economic, social, and cultural rights 
enumerated in the ICESCR.266 Such technologies increasingly play a dominant role in every aspect of life 
in modern human societies, serving as intermediaries and access points for growing number of ICESCR 
rights, including the right to education (Article 13), the right to take part in cultural life and enjoy the benefits 
of scientific progress and its applications (Article 15), the right to work (Article 6), the right to health (Article 
12) and others.267 Thus, the impacts of technology sanctions on ESC rights also merits consideration in the 
context of this analysis. In fact, given the international framing of the scope of rights obligations under the 
                                                     
264 A/HRC/41/41, para 65 
265 ibid, para 67 
266 A/HRC/RES/34/7; A/68/362, para 3 
267 Peacock, p. 21 
 41 
ICESCR and the absence of a jurisdictional clause,268 it could be argued that the ICESCR provides a more 
suitable legal framework for addressing the adverse impacts of technology sanctions.  
 
3.2.1 Right to Education 
The right to education, protected under articles 13 and 14 of ICESCR, first defines that education ‘shall 
be directed to the full development of the human personality and the sense of its dignity,’ and ‘enable all 
persons to participate effectively in a free society.’269 In General Comment 13, CESCR acknowledges the 
importance of the right to education as an empowerment right, serving as ‘the primary vehicle by which 
economically and socially marginalized adults and children can lift themselves out of poverty and obtain the 
means to participate fully in their communities.’270 CESCR further describes the essential features of 
education that states are obligated to provide for, which are availability, accessibility, acceptability, and 
adaptability.271 Notably, physical accessibility includes education via modern technology such as “distance 
learning” programs.272 Finally, outside of a state party’s jurisdiction, General Comment 13 asserts that 
states are under an obligation to ‘provide international assistance and cooperation for the full realization of 
the right to education,’ including to ensure that their actions as part of international organization ‘take due 
account of the right to education.’273  
In the digital age, ICTs play an increasingly important role with respect to this right, enabling access to 
educational materials and other modes of online learning which are ‘revolutionizing the provision of 
education.’274 Massive open online courses (MOOCs) may provide an ‘alternative path to higher education’ 
and open educational resources can provide access to materials, knowledge, and information where it 
would otherwise be unavailable.275 Given this transformed education landscape, it should not come as a 
surprise that Special Rapporteur Idriss Jazairy, after his country visit to Sudan in 2016, reported that 
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sanctions enacted by the US which target technological resources ‘also affect the right to education.’276 He 
included in his report that citizens of Sudan are ‘deprived of scholarship opportunities and of software and 
other technology, which would allow them to improve and update resources for teaching and learning,’277 
and to participate in trainings and exchanges via the Internet.278 For instance, in 2014, a graduate student 
studying software engineering reported having her graduation project severely interfered with as a result of 
US sanctions, which left her unable to access various software components of the mobile app she had 
been developing as well as educational materials and guides on how to use certain integral technologies.279 
A number of MOOCs and educational platforms like Coursera, which provides access to online courses 
and credentials, are also restricted to users in Sudan, Iran,280 and until recently, Syria.281 In Sudan, demand 
for these technologies is reportedly very high, with one activist claiming that many are turning to MOOCs 
and online educational resources as ‘many youth realize that they can’t compete regionally or nationally if 
they don’t have better education.’282 Universities have also been reported using these resources to 
supplement curriculums due to the difficulty and high cost of accessing hard copy educational materials.283  
While individuals whose access to online educational resources has been impacted by sanctions clearly 
identify it as a significant barrier to education, as does the Special Rapporteur on the negative impact of 
unilateral coercive measures, it is unclear whether access to such resources is protected by international 
human rights law. Certainly, the value of MOOCs and other ICTs for realizing the right to education is 
recognized by CESCR284 as well as the current Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education.285 However, 
the Special Rapporteur also highlights the negative impacts that digital technologies can have on the right 
to education, notably their role in expanding the digital divide when only certain schools can provide 
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technological tools, and the practice of some states to outsource the provision of education to private 
entities.286 Thus, it could hardly be said that there are legal grounds for claiming that state parties are 
obligated to provide such technologies as part of the right to education, although such tools may assist in 
meeting existing obligations. Further, while the availability and accessibility of education is an obligation of 
states and may include in part access to digital teaching materials and online education restricted under 
sanctions,287 these obligations specifically apply with respect to individuals under a State’s jurisdiction and 
thus most likely wouldn’t be relevant in this context.288  
That being said, particularly given the reported lack of access to certain educational materials and 
services in countries like Sudan and Syria, which has resulted in the heightened importance of digital 
resources, sanctioning states may see the provision of such tools as a part of their obligation to take steps 
‘through international assistance and cooperation, especially economic and technical,’ towards the full 
realization of the right to education.289 However, as noted in chapter 2.1.2, the nature of this obligation is 
not well understood and many Western states consider it only a moral obligation.290 The predominant view 
of legal scholars who recognize this obligation seems to differentiate the degree of state responsibility to 
ensure ESC rights extraterritorially on the degree of control exercised.291 Again, as sanctioning states rarely 
exercise substantial control within the target state, and as digital education resources should only be 
considered supplementary to the educational system within the targeted state, it is likely that the sanctioning 
state would only have a negative extraterritorial obligation not to interfere with the right to education.292  
Taking CESCR’s assertion that such an obligation ‘requires States parties to refrain from interfering 
directly or indirectly with the enjoyment of the Covenant rights by persons outside their territories ’ as well 
as the Maastricht Principles interpretation that State responsibility is incurred when such interference is ‘a 
foreseeable result of their conduct,’ sanctions restricting access to certain digital resources, if reasonably 
                                                     
286 ibid, para 37 and 89 
287 see GC 13, para 6(b)(ii) 
288 GC 13, para 6 
289 ICESCR Article 2(1) 
290 De Schutter et al, p. 1094 
291 Narula, p. 128 
292 If the obligation to provide ‘international assistance and cooperation,’ did emerge as a positive obligation of 
state parties, as some scholars have suggested, finding a violation on the part of sanctioning states may be more 
likely; see Narula, p. 128 
 44 
foreseeable, might amount to a violation of the sanctioning states’ obligations.293 This would also be subject 
to the degree to which the effects of sanctions interfere with the right, which the Maastricht Principles 
suggest requires a ‘real risk of nullifying or impairing the enjoyment’ of the right to education.294 A similar 
evaluation would be necessary for establishing state responsibility under the causation model described by 
in chapter 2.1.3. However, such an interpretation of a state’s extraterritorial obligations under ICESCR has 
not been tested under the treaty body and the sources relied on are not of the highest authority. Still, given 
that the obligation to provide international assistance and cooperation towards the realization of the right is 
recognized by Western states as at least a moral obligation, and given that providing such educational 
resources would likely support the goals of many sanctions regimes, it does seem that states might be 
receptive to arguments that states have a moral responsibility to facilitate access to such resources under 
the ICESCR. As a final note, considering that many digital educational resources are privately owned, the 
respective companies should adhere to their responsibilities to respect human rights under the UNGPs in 
responding to sanctions and the host states should exercise effective due diligence to avoid facing indirect 
attribution of extraterritorial violations of the right to education.295 
 
3.2.2 Benefits of Scientific Progress 
Each of the previous sections considers the human rights impact of technology sanctions on the basis 
of the role that restricted technologies have in exercising a particular right, whether it be freedom of 
expression, assembly and association, the right to privacy, or the right to education. Thus, the finding of a 
legal obligation to provide access to or refrain from interfering with access to certain technologies rests on 
their particular value and relative importance within the content of the rights protections. This section 
considers whether under the right to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress, an argument could be made 
for the obligation to protect access to such technologies outright. Enumerated in both the UDHR (Article 
27) and ICESCR (Article 15), the right to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications was 
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clearly considered an important element of the fundamental rights guaranteed to all, likely due to science’s 
contributions to human and societal development.296 Unfortunately, perhaps due to its vague formulation in 
law and lack of established jurisprudence, the right has largely been neglected by human rights bodies and 
legal scholars.297 However, it is receiving renewed attention as the human rights community seeks to 
strengthen the link between science and human rights given the ever more dominant role that science and 
technology play in the exercise of nearly all enumerated rights.298 In this way, the right to the benefits 
scientific progress could be viewed as a means of addressing situations where it is unclear what the precise 
content of other existing rights might be in the digital age.299  
While there is no authoritative interpretive text to ICESCR Article 15, a number of legal experts such 
as Audrey Chapman300 and the Special Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights, have cautiously attempted 
to articulate its content. Considering these interpretations alongside the text of Article 15 itself, it would 
appear that the right generally establishes  that the benefits of science and its applications (i.e. technology) 
should be accessible to everybody, and thus broadly disseminated.301 The Special Rapporteur in the field 
of cultural rights has also asserted that the ‘benefits’ of science includes ‘the scientific process, its 
methodologies and tools,’302 which in the context of digital technologies would seem to encompass both 
the technology products as well as the software and related tools necessary to engage in the process of 
technology development itself. Additionally, Article 15(4) provides that State Parties recognize the benefits 
of encouraging and developing international contacts and cooperation in the scientific field, thus giving the 
right an international, extraterritorial dimension. Further, advances in science require ‘require freedom of 
inquiry and free circulation of ideas and research findings,’ which may imply non-interference with other 
rights including freedom of thought, expression, movement, and association.303 As Chapman, one of the 
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leading legal experts on the right to the benefits of scientific progress argues, ‘any limitation of or 
interference with these rights would constitute a violation of the right to enjoy the benefits of scientific 
progress.’304 As such, given the more international framing of the ICESCR by comparison to the strict 
understanding of jurisdiction under the ICCPR, in the case of the effects of technology sanctions on the 
right to freedom of expression or the right to privacy for instance,305 Article 15 may provide a more solid 
legal basis for establishing a breach of extraterritorial state obligations on the part of the sanctioning state. 
Many if not all of the effects of technology sanctions noted in previous sections of this analysis implicate 
the right to the benefits of scientific progress as it is described here. For instance, access to a free and 
open Internet, the ability to use online platforms to access and share information, and access to encryption 
tools, amount to applications of scientific progress in and of themselves and enable the sharing of 
information and resources about scientific progress where it would otherwise be denied.306 Specific tools 
like the Samsung, Apple, and Google app stores, which have been or continue to be blocked in states 
targeted by US sanctions,307 are some of the largest repositories of mobile technologies and tools and are 
used globally to access and disseminate the majority of mobile ICT tools in existence. Platforms such as 
Gitlab, GAE, Google Cloud Platform, AWS, and Digital Ocean, frequently used by developers and 
technology companies, have also been made inaccessible by US technology sanctions, further limiting the 
ability of individuals within sanctioned states to participate in the ICT economy and access or develop 
modern ICT products and resources.308 Other sectors, such as health and humanitarian aid, have been 
affected by technology sanctions in Syria, such as the WHO-reported incident of a CT scanner that required 
special license for an US-made component which took 6 months to receive, depriving patients of potentially 
life-saving technology.309 Humanitarian actors in Syria also report that US-sourced radio 
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telecommunications tools which are standardized across the UN had been affected by sanctions, causing 
delays in their work as they sought proper licensing to bypass sanctions.310 
In the absence of any authoritative legal interpretation of right to the benefits of scientific progress and 
established jurisprudence, it is difficult to say what forms of scientific knowledge and technologies are 
guaranteed under the right and to what extent states are obligated to ensure access to them, both within 
their own borders and extraterritorially.311 However, it is likely, given the growing importance of the right to 
the benefits of scientific progress in the modern world, that some of these persisting questions will be 
answered in the future, either through a CESCR general comment or via individual complaints. Until such 
developments occur, in evaluating whether the effects described above as well as in previous sections of 
this analysis amount to a violation of the sanctioning state’s legal obligations under the right to enjoy the 
benefits of scientific progress, it will be necessary to consider the content of Article 15 in light of recent 
interpretations, which largely infer obligations from the content of other more established ICESCR rights. 
As with all other human rights, states are considered to have obligations to respect, protect, and fulfill 
the right to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress. Under the obligation to respect, states must ensure that 
their laws, policies, and actions do not interfere with the exercise of the right, nor those freedoms 
indispensable to its advancement.312 The obligation to protect includes a positive duty to prevent and 
mitigate possible infringements of fundamental rights linked to the misuse of scientific and technological 
developments by third parties,313 while the obligation to fulfill requires positive measures to promote the 
‘development and diffusion of science and technologies.’314 As noted previously, Article 15(4) as well as 
the Article 2(1) of ICESCR may also provide for an extraterritorial dimension to the right. In the context of 
the right to water, this extraterritorial dimension is understood by CESCR to include a negative obligation 
to refrain from depriving another country of the ability to realize the right within its own borders.315 A similar 
obligation may also apply with respect to Article 15, and would have particular importance in the context of 
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technology sanctions, which may deprive access to ICT products and resources protected under Article 15. 
Chapman also argues that there may be a positive extraterritorial obligation under Article 15 for developed 
countries in particular to ‘furnish assistance in the fields of science and technology and to enable access to 
essential knowledge and technologies,’316 noting however that what this encompasses will need to be 
elaborated.317 She completes this line of thought by asking whether there might be technologies ‘so 
essential to the welfare of the inhabitants of particular countries,’ that there should be a collective right of 
access from the international community?318  
Some have answered this question in the affirmative when it comes to modern ICTs and the Internet, 
including the Special Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights who claims that Article 15 should ‘be 
understood as including a right to have access to and use ICTs and other technologies in self-determined 
and empowering ways.’319 She also asserts that ‘with the Internet emerging as a critical platform for 
scientific and cultural flows and exchanges, freedom of access to it and maintaining its open architecture 
are important for upholding the right of people to science and culture.’320 A similar understanding of the right 
was advocated at a 2007 UNESCO experts’ meeting, with one participant arguing that the right to the 
benefits of scientific progress ‘should be used as a means to ensure the spread of ICTs and combat 
exclusion from non-access to the Internet.’321 Finally, asserting both negative and positive extraterritorial 
obligations under the right with respect to modern ICTs, Chapman has also posited that state parties must 
‘refrain from erecting barriers to scientific communication and collaboration across borders,’ and facilitate 
the transfer of knowledge resources and products.322 
Given the expansive nature of the technology sanctions discussed previously in this chapter and the 
above-recognized importance of the types of knowledge and tools restricted by sanctions for the enjoyment 
of the right to the benefits of scientific progress, it seems possible that sanctions could be held to interfere 
with the right for individuals in the targeted state. Regardless of the availability of alternative tools and 
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software, restricting access to numerous major cloud computing platforms, site developers, and app stores 
substantially interferes with both the scientific process of technology development and access to its 
products. Further, given the recognition of the unique importance of ICT tools within the scope of ICESCR 
Article 15, it would appear that access to such tools would be broadly protected and their protection may 
even be considered a core obligation under the right.323 Particularly given that access to these scientific 
applications is often already heavily restricted by the territorial state in the case studies examined, imposing 
technology sanctions within these repressive contexts where global ICT tools are of the utmost value, has 
substantial adverse impacts on the ability of individuals to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress. As such, 
the state imposing technology sanctions of the type described might be said to interfere directly or 
indirectly324 with the international transfer of and access to scientific knowledge and technologies within the 
targeted state in substantial and likely foreseeable ways. Thus, under the framework asserted by the 
Maastricht Principles as well as the causation model of extraterritorial jurisdiction established by the 
IACtHR, technology sanctions may violate a sanctioning state’s negative extraterritorial obligations to 
respect the right to the benefits of scientific progress.325  
Considering that Article 15(4) also specifically enumerates the benefits of international cooperation and 
assistance in addition to its status as a general obligation of state parties under Article 2(1), it would appear 
that this component of the right has special significance, perhaps amounting to a positive obligation on state 
parties to allow for and facilitate the transfer of science and technology to foreign states.326 As discussed 
previously, the nature of extraterritorial positive obligations is likely dependent on the degree of control 
exercised in the foreign state or the degree to which the state exercises ‘decisive influence’ over this right.327 
Given that many technology companies are centralized in a few select counties, particularly the US, certain 
states may be in a position of decisive influence with respect to the right to enjoy the benefits of scientific 
progress, and may have positive obligations to facilitate access to these tools extraterritorially.328 Thus, 
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imposing broad technology sanctions may be seen as a breach of such obligations under Article 15 
amounting to a violation. Additionally, as with all previous rights discussed in the context of technology 
sanctions, it is often the internal decision-making of companies like Google, Apple, and others in response 
to sanctions which directly result in the deprivation of access to certain products and services.329 However, 
based on its positive obligation to protect the right to the benefits of scientific progress, a sanctioning state 
might be required to revise sanctions regimes to explicitly permit private actors to export certain 
technologies or exert direct influence over them to ensure their compliance with human rights under its due 
diligence obligations.330 If it does not take such measures, and in light of the broad scope of restrictions on 
the right to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress described above, it seems very likely that such 
interferences with the right may be indirectly attributable to the state, even if they are the result of a private 
company’s actions. Regardless, overcompliance on the part of companies, such as has been reported with 
LinkedIn’s decision to delete all Syrian users from the platform,331 exacerbates the effects of technology 
sanctions on the rights of individuals in the target state, in particular with respect to the right to the benefits 
of scientific progress. Thus, further elaboration as to the content of Article 15 should include discussion of 
the significant role of private actors in realizing this right and provide specific guidance as to what is required 
of multinational corporations under their responsibility to respect the right.  
 
4. Conclusion 
 
The above analysis as to whether states may be held legally responsible for the impact of technology 
sanctions on human rights illustrates the difficulty of applying the human rights framework to these types of 
situation. The uncertain nature of more flexible models of extraterritorial jurisdiction, limited jurisprudence 
establishing the content of rights in light of rapid ICT developments, and the relatively untested argument 
for indirect attribution of human rights violations on the basis of due diligence, mean that much of this 
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analysis is speculative, based on in-progress legal evolutions. However, what is demonstrated clearly is 
that technology sanctions can have significant impact on the exercise and protection of human rights in the 
targeted state. Building on the understanding that ‘the same rights that people have offline must also be 
protected online,’332 more recent interpretations of human rights increasingly recognize the essential nature 
of digital technologies to the way that these rights are protected and exercised in the modern world. Thus, 
there is solid basis for arguing that intentionally depriving individuals of access to ICT technologies may 
amount to an interference with the rights examined above.333 
Yet, establishing interference with a right does not automatically amount to state responsibility. This is 
particularly the case given the emergence of digital technologies and their importance across global 
societies, which allow states to exert substantial influence over human rights in a foreign state, absent any 
physical presence or effective control.334  As demonstrated in this paper, the failure of the human rights law 
framework to adapt to these new scenarios may lead to an accountability gap, wherein states can seriously 
affect the enjoyment of human rights in a foreign state through measures such as technology sanctions 
without incurring any legal responsibility. Thus, dominant models of extraterritorial jurisdiction likely need to 
be replaced or reinterpreted so that they may better account for state actions with extraterritorial impact, 
particularly with respect to civil and political rights obligations under the ICCPR which are more strictly 
limited by territorial control and jurisdiction. Support for the impact model of extraterritorial jurisdiction under 
HRC General Comment 36 as well as the IACtHR’s advancement of the causation model,335 both indicate 
a growing recognition by international human rights bodies of the need to reevaluate existing bases of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction, which may increase the likelihood of state responsibility for acts like the 
imposition of technology sanctions resulting in adverse extraterritorial impact on human rights. 
Given the ICESCR’s lack of a jurisdictional requirement and general obligation to provide international 
assistance and cooperation towards the realization of the enumerated rights, it could be considered a more 
appropriate means of accounting for actions with extraterritorial human rights effects where effective control 
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is absent. This is supported by the fact that previous efforts to advance state responsibility for the 
extraterritorial human rights impact of sanctions, such as CESCR General Comment 8, have centered 
around economic, social and cultural rights.336 Additionally, as some have considered,337 the oft-neglected 
right to the benefits of scientific progress could take on unique importance in the digital era and provide a 
basis for addressing the control over ICTs that mostly Western states and the technology companies under 
their jurisdiction assert globally. However, the lack of attention given to establishing the nature of 
extraterritorial obligations under the ICESCR as well as the lack of a general comment or relevant 
jurisprudence on Article 15, hinder the application of this body of rights to the matter of technology 
sanctions.  
Thus, despite strong condemnations of the ‘egregious human rights impact’ of economic sanctions from 
the current Special Rapporteur on the matter, and his assertion that ‘such measures are clearly illegal and 
their source countries should be called to account,’ there is narrow possibility within the existing human 
rights framework for such accountability to take place with respect to technology sanctions. The Maastricht 
Principles and CESCR General Comment 8338 make similar statements to the Special Rapporteur, holding 
that sanctions regimes which do not seek to minimize the negative impact on human rights as much as 
possible may be considered unlawful.339 However, as demonstrated, this type of claim is relatively 
unfounded when it comes to the broad and serious restrictions on technology imposed by US sanctions 
regimes in Iran, Syria, and Sudan, exposing the limitations of the way that state obligations have typically 
been understood under international human rights law. It is the hope of this author that greater recognition 
of the serious extraterritorial impact that policies like technology sanctions can have on human rights, and 
the legal challenges presented by such situations, will drive forward the effort to begin to resolve some of 
these outstanding issues with the existing human rights law framework and provide a more effective route 
to state responsibility. 
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